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Abstract: The traditional Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) system, in which the
information maintained in tags is passive and static, has no intelligent decision-making
ability to suit application and environment dynamics. The Second-Generation RFID
(2G-RFID) system, referred as 2G-RFID-sys, is an evolution of the traditional RFID system
to ensure better quality of service in future networks. Due to the openness of the active
mobile codes in the 2G-RFID system, the realization of conveying intelligence brings a
critical issue: how can we make sure the backend system will interpret and execute mobile
codes in the right way without misuse so as to avoid malicious attacks? To address this
issue, this paper expands the concept of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) by introducing
context-aware computing, and then designs a secure middleware for backend systems,
named Two-Level Security Enhancement Mechanism or 2L-SEM, in order to ensure the
usability and validity of the mobile code through contextual authentication and role analysis.
According to the given contextual restrictions, 2L-SEM can ﬁltrate the illegal and invalid
mobile codes contained in tags. Finally, a reference architecture and its typical application
are given to illustrate the implementation of 2L-SEM in a 2G-RFID system, along with theSensors 2011, 11 6744
simulation results to evaluate how the proposed mechanism can guarantee secure execution
of mobile codes for the system.
Keywords: radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID); context-aware computing; role-based
access control (RBAC); mobile code
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is intended to be rich in context awareness, and realized by various
object sensing and information gathering technologies, such as Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID),
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), etc. As the main technology for conveying the terminal information
of object identiﬁcation, the RFID system is one of main components of IoT. In [1], the traditional RFID
system is referred as the First-Generation RFID System (1G-RFID-Sys). However, the information
stored in the RFID tags (The Generation 2 (Gen-2) tag can be used [2], which is far superior to the
Gen-1 version offering reduced inter-reader interference, faster read/write speeds, higher levels of data
encryption, longer battery life and more data storage.) is intrinsically passive, static and non-intelligent.
Consequently, the 1G-RFID-Sys neither suits the dynamics of the IoT environment nor has the intelligent
decision-making ability to enable smart services with quick response. Therefore, Chen et al. proposed
an evolution of 1G-RFID-Sys to a second-generation RFID system [1,3], referred as 2G-RFID-Sys
(This is not to be confused with the Gen-2 RFID tag). The 2G-RFID-Sys tag contains not only static
information, such as object identiﬁcation and description, but also “mobile codes”. Mobile code is a type
of encoded procedural directive and capable of intelligently “notifying” the system what operations or
services should be provided in special occasions. The use of mobile code enables the 2G-RFID-Sys to
be more extendible, reliable, and intelligent than the 1G-RFID-Sys.
Though the system extendibility and practicability can be effectively improved in a mobile and
ubiquitous environment, the implementation of the intelligence conveyed in 2G-RFID-Sys brings a
critical security issue due to the openness of mobile code. For example, how to prevent mobile code
from being misused or abused in order to avoid malicious attacks which cause disruption of the Backend
System (BS).
To address this issue, we extend our previous work [4] and introduce context-aware computing to
expand Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [5], while categorizing tags by role, i.e., one tag belongs to
one user and different users can be categorized by role. Assume each user is rational and follows the
behaviorial pattern of location-aware constraints within a certain time interval. Mobile code is the hidden
representation of user’s requirements. In order to categorize the tags in which the mobile code is stored,
we actually divide users into different categories of roles. In this paper, the role is simply determined
by several kinds of context-aware information, such as time, location, and historic service requested
by mobile code. Based on the roles categorized according to contextual restrictions, we propose a
Two-Level Security Enhancement Mechanism (2L-SEM) to prevent the misuse and abuse of mobile
code, and eliminate illegal and invalid mobile codes in 2G-RFID-Sys. 2L-SEM operates in two phases
as follows:Sensors 2011, 11 6745
 Contextual authentication: A user needs to write some codes into the RFID tag informing the
system what kinds of services he/she wants the system to provide. However, some user with
ill intentions will inject a virus, rather than write service codes. To solve this problem, on the
reception of a mobile code from the RFID reader, the information is veriﬁed in order to ensure it
be satisﬁed pre-existing rules based on contextual constraints in BS authentication where the code
is interpreted, otherwise, the code cannot be executed.
 Role analysis: Though some intrusive users can replicate mobile codes to pass through the
authentication phase, the contextual information of the malicious user does not correspond to
the role of the legal user, thus, the system can identify such malicious user and protect the legal
user. Even if a code itself is acceptable to the system, once the “immediate role” has conﬂict
with the “proﬁle-based role”, the BS will prevent executing the code, i.e., reject the services
requested by the mobile code, and any following communications cannot be activated. Note that
therolesinourmechanismarenotthesameastheenvironmentonesdeﬁnedinthesystemasin[5].
By comparison, they can be changed dynamically with the context-aware environment in which
objects are involved. Accordingly, the 2G-RFID-Sys can adjust a subject’s role dynamically, and
thus restrain the role’s action capacity to reduce the workload of role management.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce related works in Section 2.
Section 3 presents the security issues for 2G-RFID-Sys. In Section 4, taking into account the location
and time usability, the restrictions for the usability and validity of mobile code are discussed in detail,
in addition, the 2L-SEM is proposed. Section 5 describes and evaluates a distributed security solution
for the 2L-SEM-based system through a special application case. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper
with some suggestions for future work.
2. Related Works
Typically, an RFID tag broadcasts the contained information to an RFID reader without certifying the
reader’s identity, which is prone to information leakage and other security issues [6]. Recently, research
has been mainly focused on the protection of data privacy in RFID tags. It shows that the well-used data
security policies can guarantee information security for low-cost passive tags. In addition, RFID reader’s
access to tag can be controlled through some schemes, such as mutual authentication [7], light-weighted
cryptographic algorithms [8], collision-resolution protocols [9], blocking technology [10], etc., which
can ensure the integrity and credibility of tag information with minimum information leakage and
legality of tag owners. Zhou et al. proposed the Smart RFID Keeper (SRK), which controls reader’s
unauthorized access to tags based on blocking technology [11]. Canard et al. presented the ﬁrst security
model for RFID authentication/identiﬁcation privacy-preserving systems [12]. Rieback et al. proposed
an effective scheme to enhance the security and privacy about passive RFID tags [13]. A lightweight
privacy-preserving authentication protocol for RFID systems was proposed by E. Blass et al. [14]. The
protocol uses a simple and round-based setup to let tags send the results and random nonces using small
fan-in functions to the reader.
In the ubiquitous environment, applications are context-aware and user-centric [15,16].
Context-aware computing is an ability of these applications to detect and react to the variousSensors 2011, 11 6746
environments [17]. There are four types of context, i.e., location, identity, time and activity.
Burstein et al. applied mobile agents to the highly dynamic and variable context of the healthcare
emergency decision-support domain [18,19], however, location awareness was not implemented.
In [20], the RFID-based Campus Context-Aware Notiﬁcation System (R-CCANS) was proposed to
deliver notiﬁcation to intended recipients in timely manner. R-CCANS uses contextual attributes of users
in inferring the right notiﬁcation to display, and then acts autonomously while the context is detected and
processed. However, these actions are achieved passively from BS according to the tag context, such as
the tag ID and location ID.
RBAC is an approach to restricting system access to authorized users, and sometimes referred as
role-based security [21]. RBAC allows policies to be speciﬁed in terms of subject roles, each of
which can be viewed as a set of subjects with the same permissions, rather than a set of individual
subject identities [22]. In [5], K. Lee et al. proposed a context-aware security model for the dynamic
environment based on multiple authentications, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), and extended
Generalized RBAC (GRBAC). In the security model, the output of GRBAC is calculated according to
the contextual information of tag, and then is adopted to MAUT as a utility value to calculate the security
level of the user/tag. Based on the security level, the corresponding actions will be authorized by the BS.
With encoded rules that are stored as mobile codes in RFID tag, the capability of 2G-RFID-Sys is
enhanced in order to act upon context-aware changes, and adapt services according to the dynamics
of networks and end-user requirements. However, most of research pays more attentions to on-tag
and off-tag security protection strategies between tag and reader, which is just suitable for static tag
information protection, but inefﬁcient for eliminating potential security hazards in 2G-RFID-Sys. In
some other research, tag provides both static and active information of the user to the system based on
RBAC, and achieve service from provider passively, that cannot take advantage of the mobile codes’
property in 2G-RFID-Sys. An optional module of the 2G-RFID reader, called identiﬁcation ﬁlter
(ID-ﬁlter), is used to check the ID information of tags. It provides security by maintaining a list of
IDs that represents the validity of tags [1]. However, the security service provided by the simple ID-ﬁlter
is limited, and a security enhancement mechanism should be designed to improve the security capability
of BS.
The main functional components of 2G-RFID-Sys are RFID reader, BS and service response system.
The RFID reader consists of a passive information manager, a code information manager, and an
ID-Filter. The passive information manager receives identiﬁcation and description information from
the RFID tags, and the ID-ﬁlter checks the information through a list of IDs. The BS consists of an
Electronic Product Code (EPC) network and a middleware layer. The information of tag approved
through the ID-ﬁlter will be forwarded to the EPC network to create a record of the tag [1].
3. Security Requirement in 2G-RFID System
Althoughthearchitectureandarchetypalapplicationof2G-RFID-Syshavebeenpresentedinprevious
work [1], the security issues are still in cloud. In this paper, we consider the security requirements in
terms of two aspects, namely, static information security (denoted by static-info-security) and mobile
code security (denoted by code-security). Currently, most research is focused on static-info-security,
such as data and privacy protection, which are commonly used in 1G-RFID-Sys. This paper brieﬂySensors 2011, 11 6747
addresses the security issue of 2G-RFID-Sys for the view of mobile code, such that legal codes are only
executed by the authorized BS and evaluated in terms of validity.
The validity of a mobile code is closely related to the context when the mobile code is received,
interpreted and executed. For instance, it will be affected by the tag writer, and the activity time and
location of the mobile code. In a distributed and mobile network, a user writes some codes into the
RFID tag informing the system of the kind of service he/she wants the system to provide. However,
some user with bad intentions may inject a virus rather than write service codes, which will be addressed
in the following sections.
4. Two-Level Security Enhancement Mechanism (2L-SEM)
In this section, we ﬁrst provide some presentations of the contextual restrictions, and then propose
2L-SEM based on expanded RBAC.
4.1. Contextual Restriction
By means of the restricted usability of mobile code, it is guaranteed that the BS interprets and executes
the right mobile codes, while pernicious codes are prevented. To identify the usability and validity of
mobile code, this paper deﬁnes two types of contextual restrictions, i.e., location restriction and time
restriction, as shown below.
(1) Location Restriction
Location restriction is the constraint for the location validity of mobile code. In this paper, location
validity indicates whether a mobile code can be activated, and is related to the present position of the
RFID tag that maintains the mobile code and belongs to a legal user. That is to say, if the location is
other than the user’s usual location in a non-authorized area, the mobile code cannot be activated by any
BS, even if it is authenticated and usable.
Let CL be the location restriction set, if (1):
8m 2 M[9l 2 CL ) (m;l) 2 M  CL] (1)
is satisﬁed, mobile code m is available at location l. Thus, the function of location restriction for the
mobile codes in set M can be deﬁned as (2):
Locations(m 2 M) = fc j c 2 CL ^ (m;c) 2 M  CLg (2)
It should be noted that the location restriction is independent to the speciﬁc location deﬁnitions.
(2) Time Restriction
Time restriction is the constraint that is placed on the number of activities recorded and the activated
time of a mobile code. The mobile code cannot be activated if its captured time does not satisfy the
time restriction, or it has been activated more times than that allowed by the time restriction. There are
two types of time restrictions, namely, continuous time restriction and periodic time restriction. If theSensors 2011, 11 6748
activated time is constrained within a continuous time interval, it treats the continuous time interval as a
continuous time restriction, otherwise, if the activated time is periodic in a pre-given time interval, the
period is a time restriction for the mobile code.
Prior to giving the deﬁnition of time restriction, the time variable is deﬁned based on a time pattern,
which consists of some components (year, month, day, hour, second, etc.) and combination form
(i.e., DateTime) of time variable. The time pattern is represented via the time variable construction
grammar deﬁned in Figure 1. In the grammar, if a sub-variable (i.e., a ﬁeld of time variable) is a “”
string, it means that the sub-variable can be an arbitrary legal value. To illustrate the grammar clearly,
some time variables and their values are given in Table 1. Consequently, we deﬁne a time range variable
as an ordered pair < t1;t2 > composed of two time variables t1 and t2, and the time judging function
InTimeRange is deﬁned as (3). If the time variable tv is within the time range < t1;t2 >, then the value
of function InTimeRange is True, otherwise, it is False.
Figure 1. Time variable construction grammar.
d ! 0j1j2j3j4j5j6j7j8j9
year ! [ j d]4
month ! [ j d]2 :: $month 6= 2 ) $month 2 [1::12]
day ! [ j d]2 :: $day 6= 2 ) $day 2 [1::31]
weekday ! 1j2j3j4j5j6j7[;weekday]
weekdays !  j weekday
hour ! [ j d]2 :: $hour 6= 2 ) $hour 2 [0::23]
minute ! [ j d]2 :: $minute 6= 2 ) $minute 2 [0::59]
second ! [ j d]2 :: $second 6= 2 ) $second 2 [0::59]
Date ::=< year >   < month >   < day >
Time ::=< hour >:< minute >:< second >
DateTime ::= Date   weekdays   Time
Table 1. Examples for time variable.
Time variable Value
2009-12-30-*-12:00:00 2009-12-30 12:00:00
2009-12-30-*-12:**:** 2009-12-30 12:00:00 -12:59:59
2009-12-**-1,3,5-**:**:** Any time on every Monday, Wednesday and Friday in Dec. 2009
****-01-**-*-**:**:** Any time in January in each year
InTimeRange(t
v;< t1;t2 >) =

Ture tv  t1 ^ tv  t2
False others
(3)
Table 2 gives some instances to illustrate the relationship between the function InTimeRange and
variables. For example, a valid time interval, constructed by the time range variable given in the 3th
row, is from Monday to Tuesday or from Friday to next Tuesday in December 2009, and the value of the
time variable (2009-12-30-3-12:35:45) is not within the time interval, thus, the value of InTimeRange is
False. However, the value of the time variable (2010-02-01-1-12:35:45) in the last row is not in the validSensors 2011, 11 6749
time range from December to next January in each year, therefore, the value of the time judging function
is False.
Table 2. Relationship between variables and function InTimeRange.
Time variable Time range variable Value
2009-12-30-3-12:35:45 (2009-12-30-*-12:00:00, 2009-12-30-*-13:00:00) True
2009-12-30-3-12:35:45 (2009-12-30-*-12:**:**, 2009-12-30-*-12:30:**) False
2009-12-30-3-12:35:45 (2009-12-**-1,5-**:**:**, 2009-**-**-2-**:**:**) False
2009-12-30-3-12:35:45 (****-1-**-*-**:**:**, ****-12-**-*-**:**:**) True
2010-02-01-1-12:35:45 (****-12-**-*-**:**:**, ****-1-**-*-**:**:**) False
We denote by Count the maximum times that a mobile code can be activated within a duration time,
which is from time t1 to t2. Therefore, according to the previous deﬁnition, where the time restriction
consists of a maximum number of activities recorded and an activated time for the mobile code, the time
restriction pattern for the mobile code can be denoted as < t1;t2;Count >. We also denote the time
restriction set by CT. If (4):
8m 2 M(9c 2 CT ) (m;c) 2 M  CT) (4)
is satisﬁed, then the mobile code m will be activated for at the most Count times within the given time
range < t1;t2 > under the time restriction c. Therefore, the time restriction function of the mobile code
m can be deﬁned as (5):
ActTime(m 2 M) = fc j c 2 CT ^ (m;c) 2 M  CTg (5)
4.2. Security Enhancement Mechanism
In this section, this paper designs a BS secure middleware, or 2L-SEM, to ensure the usability and
validity of mobile code through two phases: contextual authentication and role analysis. Since a tag
belongs to a user and the mobile code is the representation of the hidden representation of user’s
requirements, the paper categorizes different tags by role. Because the associated roles with access
privileges only changes infrequently within organizations relative to users, they can provide a stable and
reliable control policy for the 2G-RFID-Sys based on the expanded RBAC.
(1) Contextual Authentication
This phase authenticates the usability of the mobile code delivered from the 2G-RFID reader. The
usability is determined by several types of information of the mobile code, such as who wrote it, when
and where it was written, and its valid period. Upon the reception of the mobile code, the information is
veriﬁed to ensure that the pre-existing conditions/rules are satisﬁed based on the contextual constraints in
BS. After passing the authentication by BS, the code is acceptable, otherwise, it is refused to be executed.
It is assumed that each role corresponds to a logical RFID tag group. The tags belonging to the same
tag group play the same role and have similar mobile code sets. Each tag can play one or more roles, and
each role can be played by one or more tags. Tag and mobile code are associated through role, and the
relationships between these objects (i.e., tag, role, and mobile code) are many-to-many mapping. Let T,Sensors 2011, 11 6750
R, and M be a non-empty ﬁnite tag set, a non-empty ﬁnite role set, and a non-empty ﬁnite mobile code
set, respectively. Let t be a tag, r be a role, and m be a mobile code. If (6) is satisﬁed, the mobile code
m maintained in tag t belongs to role r, and then it is valid to the BS.
8(t 2 T ^ r 2 R ^ m 2 M)9[(t;r) 2 T  R ^ (r;m) 2 R  M] (6)
Thus, for corresponding mobile code usability, this paper formally deﬁnes a restriction model as a
5-tuple (T;R;M;C;f), where C is the set of authorization and restriction rules associated with the
special application system, f is the mapping from the tag set T to the mobile code set M and constrained
by C. The location restriction set CL and time restriction set CT, deﬁned in Section 4.1, are both the
subsets of C. The constrained mapping f in the 5-tuple is described as below:
f(t 2 T) = fm j 9[(r;m;c) 2 R  M  C][(t;r) 2 T  R ^ (r;m) 2 R  M]g (7)
(2) Role Analysis
The role analysis checks whether the mobile code is a legal and valid member of a role or not. Even
though a mobile code has gone through the authentication phrase, the tag in which the code is stored will
be invalid or inactive for the system. For instance, two users with the same tag ID are waiting for service
requested by the mobile code at the same time at different locations. If one of them is an invalid member
of the role, the BS will not execute the code, and any following communication cannot be established.
Fortunately, in the 2L-SEM, the validity of mobile code is ensured via the role analysis for tag. If a tag
goes through the role analysis, it will be activated and obtain a permission that is the authorization of
mobile code execution for a role. That is to say, the mobile code is a legal and valid member of the role,
and will be accepted by the system and executed in the BS.
Before describing the policy of role analysis in 2L-SEM, we categorize the tag state Tstate, which is
used to indicate the tag’s active state in the system, into three types, i.e., attendee, actor, and absentee.
Let T denote a non-empty ﬁnite tag set, SoT denote the state of the tag, and then
SoT(t 2 T) 2 Tstate = fattendee;actor;absenteeg
Expanding the concept in RABC, we then classify the membership of roles into three types,
i.e., potential member or pMember, admissive member or aMember, and valid member or vMember.
Let t be a tag, r be a role, and c be a contextual restriction rule maintained in BS. Assume the sets R, M,
T, and C are the same as that deﬁned in the proposed 5-tuple restriction model. The three types of role
memberships are deﬁned as follows.
pMember(r 2 R) = ft j t 2 T ^ (r;t) 2 R  Tg (8)
aMember(r 2 R) =
(
t j ^
(
t 2 pMember(r)
SoT(t) = attendee
)
(9)
vMember(r 2 R) =
8
> <
> :
t j ^
8
> <
> :
u 2 aMember(r)
SoT(t) = actor
8(r;c) 2 R  C ) t  (r;c)
9
> =
> ;
(10)Sensors 2011, 11 6751
where t  (r;c) means that tag t satisﬁes restriction c of role r.
As a potential member of role r, tag t is also an admissive member of role r, only when it is an
attendee of system. If its state is actor and information matches the restrictions of role r, tag t is also a
valid member of role r, and can go through role analysis, as described by (11).
Member(r 2 R) = aMember(r) [ vMember(r)  pMember(r)  T (11)
In the 2L-SEM, a tag cannot be an admissive member and a valid one at the same time.
8t 2 T;r 2 R ) :(t 2 aMember(r) ^ t 2 vMember(r)) (12)
5. Reference Architecture and Its Application
A 2L-SEM-based reference architecture is designed for 2G-RFID-Sys in this section. In addition, a
highway management system is provided as an application case in order to illustrate how the proposed
2L-SEM can be applied and how it guarantees the system security and performance.
5.1. Reference Architecture
In this subsection, we design a 2L-SEM-based reference architecture for the 2G-RFID-Sys. In the
reference architecture shown in Figure 2, the code interceptor is responsible for constructing audit
requests relying on the context of a mobile code delivered from an RFID reader, and applies these
audit requests to the security manager. Then, the security manager will operate our security enhance
middleware, i.e., 2L-SEM, to make a judgment regarding the request by searching the authorization and
restriction rules stored in the rule database. If an authority exists and the request is in accordance with
the rules, then the security manager returns a permission message, otherwise, it denies the request of the
mobile code execution. While the code interceptor receives a permission massage sent by the security
manager, the corresponding mobile code will be forwarded to the code executor which is corresponding
to the middleware layer in the original 2G-RFID BS.
Figure 2. Reference architecture for 2L-SEM-based system.
Backend system
Middleware layer
RFID
reader
Code
interceptor
Security
manager
Code
executor
Service
Response
system
Rule
database
mc mc ac
* mc: mobile code         * ac:  action
EPC network
Each application of 2G-RFID-Sys is composed of several management areas. For each area, we
allocate a security manager or a security manager group equipped with a rule subset, as an effective
way to reduce the time consumption for the identiﬁcation of a valid request. However, since theSensors 2011, 11 6752
security managers should cooperate with each other to make a judgment, the system performance will
be degraded. Furthermore, the 2L-SEM-based system can add a component to notify security managers
to overload the rule subset when changes occur.
5.2. System Instance
In the highway management application, a 2G-RFID-Sys tag is carried by a vehicle, which is a private
car but not an ambulance, and stores a mobile code MC 001: “emergency: on”. While the car is passing
through a speed detection point equipped with an RFID reader on the highway, the availability of the
mobile code decides whether it can be interpreted and executed by the BS. And then, the corresponding
service or action will be provided.
Next, some examples are given in Table 3 to illustrate the mapping relationship between subjects
and time restrictions. Each subject includes three items: tag, role and mobile code. Different tags
(e.g., Tag 001 and Tag 002) with different rule sets are playing the same role Private Car, and the same
mobile code (e.g., MC 001) is carried by different roles (e.g., Private Car and Ambulance). The time
restriction consists of the time variable StartTime, the time variable EndTime, the maximum number
of activities recorded, and the DurationTime. The mobile code playing as a role can be activated within
a time range < StartTime;EndTime >. However, if the value of StartTime is Null, the activated time
range is < tw;EndTime >, where tw is the time when the code was written in the tag. Furthermore,
if the value of EndTime is also Null, the mobile code can be activated within the time range
< tw;tw + EndTime >. Finally, if the value of DurationTime is 0, the mobile code can be activated
at anytime.
As shown in Table 3, if the tag is carried by a private car, MC 001 can only be activated during six
hours. However, it is available at anytime if it is stored in an ambulance tag. As mentioned above, the
mobile code MC 001 can be written not only in an ambulance’s tag, but also in a private car’s tag. The
driver of a private car is subject to an emergency situation while transporting a pregnant woman to the
hospital, and then MC 001 is written in the tag carried by the car at 5:15 am of 30 November 2010.
After one day, when the car passes a speed detection point. The mobile code is delivered to the BS in the
highway speed detection system and goes through the authentication phase. However, MC 001 cannot
be activated since it is not maintained by an ambulance’s tag, but a private car’s tag whose duration time
cannot exceed six hours.
Table 3. Mapping relationship between subject and time restriction.
Tag Role MC
a StartTime EndTime Mat
b Dt
c
Tag 001 Private Car MC 001 Null Null 0 6 hours
Tag 002 Private Car MC 002 Null 2012-12-31-*-12:59:59 0 0
Tag 003 Ambulance MC 001 Null Null 0 0
Tag 004 Ambulance MC 002 2010-9-1-*-00:00:00 2010-10-31-*-12:59:59 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
aMobile code; bMax number of activities recorded; cDurationTime.Sensors 2011, 11 6753
5.3. Processing Sequence
Relative to the system instance, while the overspeed vehicle is carrying patient in a critical and
emergency situation, the code interceptor in the reference architecture will receive a permission for
executing the mobile code, and then deliver the entire information contained in the tag to BS. Otherwise,
the code interceptor will shield the mobile code, and only deliver the normal tag information (e.g., RFID
type, identiﬁcation, and object description) to BS. Consequently, the BS could dispose of the overspeed
vehicle correctly. The processing sequence is described in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Processing sequence of 2L-SEM-based system.
(wrote_time,wrote_time+6,1)
reader code interceptor security manager rule database  code executor
tag information
(MC_ID, wrote_time,…)
authentication result
filter
(role, MC_ID,…)
filter tag information
{for each mobile code}
Assumethatthereisonlyonetimerestriction, e.g., asix-houractivetimeforthemobilecodeMC 001.
Having received the mobile code, the code interceptor encapsulates a request with the time-related
context information in the form of (BS ID;MC ID;ExecutingTime), and sends the request to the
security manager. The rule
(Role any;MC ID;wrote time;wrote time + 6; 1)
as searched by the security manager, indicates that the mobile code with identiﬁcation MC ID is
effective for any role during six hours after being written into an RFID tag. If (ExecutingTime 
wrote time + 6) is satisﬁed, the security manager will send back a permission message to the code
interceptor, otherwise, a denying message will be released. According to the message returned by the
security manager, the code interceptor may ﬁlter the rejected mobile code from the tag, and then pass
forward the tag information to the code executor for subsequent work. Moreover, illegal mobile codes
can also be eliminated by the interceptor, which is able to effectively protect the BS from the damage
caused by malicious mobile codes.Sensors 2011, 11 6754
5.4. Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed 2L-SEM, we established a simulation platform for the
2L-SEM-based highway speed detection system using SimJava 2.0 [23]. In the simulation scenario
shown in Figure 4, there are three one-way lanes: Emergency Lane, Left Lane which is used for
overtaking, and Right Lane. The widths of the Left Lane and Right Lane are both 3.75 m. Each tag
is corresponding to one vehicle. The read/write range of the reader is indicated using broken arc lines.
On the Right Lane, the speed limit is 90 km/h and the minimum safety distance between vehicles is 50 m.
On the Left Lane, the speed limit is 110 km/h and the minimum safety distance is 100 m. Normally, the
speeds of vehicles on the Right Lane and the Left Lane are 80–100 km/h and 100–110 km/h, respectively.
Figure 4. Highway simulation scenario.
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It is obvious that the time interval between two vehicles is about 2 s on the Right Lane if their distance
is equal to the minimum safety distance. In the same way, that is about 3 s on the Left Lane. In the
scenario, there are no more than three vehicles (e.g., Tag1, Tag2 and Tag3) on the Right Lane between
two vehicles (e.g., Tag4 and Tag5) on the Left Lane at a given time. The time intervals between Tag1
and Tag4, between Tag1 and Tag2, between Tag2 and Tag3, and between Tag3 and Tag5 are 0, 2, 2, and
0 s, respectively. From another point of view, there is the most one vehicle (e.g., Tag4) which is running
on the Left Lane between two vehicles (e.g., Tag1 and Tag2) on the Right Lane at the same time. Each
time interval among these three vehicles ranges from 0 to 2 s.
According to the scenario described above, we assume that the time interval between tags arriving at
the reader follows an exponential distribution with a mean r. The number of mobile codes in each tagSensors 2011, 11 6755
nt is in the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 20]. We ran the platform ﬁve times with different tag
time intervals with mean r (= 2, 4, 5, 8, and 20 s) to simulate the actual situation on the highway.
In order to test the performance and capability of the 2L-SEM-based 2G-RFID system, the
circumstances of these simulations are worse than normal. Firstly, the hardware performance is very
low. For a mobile code, the average service time of the rule database td obeys the exponential distribution
with mean 0.2 s, and the average execution time of code executor te is 1 ms. We then assume the number
of mobile codes provided by system nm is 100, which is much more than that needed in the real case.
Finally, the ratio of authenticated mobile codes pa is 90%. The performance is evaluated in terms of tag
execution time, average tag processing time, and rate of mobile codes execution, with the results shown
in Figures 5–7.
First, the distribution of the tags execution time consumed in the code executor is depicted in Figure 5.
Based on the reference architecture given in Section 5.1, the average execution time of tags should be
((20=2)  pa  te =)9 ms, and the maximum execution time of tags should be (20  te =) 20 ms. In
all the ﬁve cases with different tag time intervals, 95% and 51% tags are executed within 20 and 9 ms,
respectively. The 2L-SEM-based application case can achieve the desired performance, that is to say, the
tag execution time of the system can be achieved via setting system parameters.
Figure 5. Distribution of the tags execution time.
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Hence, the efﬁciency of BS authorization and mobile code ﬁltering in the 2L-SEM-based system is
surveyed. We have measured the average processing time as a function of the number of tags under
different time intervals of tags with mean r (= 2, 4, 5, 8, 20) on the order of second, and the results are
given in Figure 6. As the number of tags increases, the average tag processing time approaches 1.9 s,
which is approximating the average service time of the rule database. It is obvious that the efﬁciency of
the designed system is decided by the service time of the rule database.Sensors 2011, 11 6756
Figure 6. Average tag processing time.
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Subsequently, we analyze the validity of the mobile code execution according to the results given
in Figure 7. Nearly 90% of mobile codes carried by all tags are executed with the exception of case
(r = 4). The ratio of authenticated mobile codes pa is 90%. It is indicated that all most authenticated
mobile codes in the application case are executed.
Figure 7. Ratio of executed mobile codes.
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To obtain insights into the performance of 2L-SEM under various average service time of rule
database for one mobile code, we have also measured the performance in terms of processing time,Sensors 2011, 11 6757
length of waiting queue, and tag waiting time for processing. The results are given in Table 4. The
arrival process of tags obeys the log-normal distribution. More speciﬁcally, with respect to the actual
vehicle trafﬁc on the highway, we vary the interval time with mean r = 0.01 and standard deviation
sd = 0.2, so the most interval time between two adjacent tags is around 1 s, and avoids a number of
short (<0.5 s) or long (>2 s) interval time. In our simulations, the number of mobile codes in one tag
is between 0 to 20, and then the processing time of one mobile code is about 100 ms. Nevertheless, the
processing time of a single tag can be 50 ms while the interval time is 1 s.
The performance of the 2L-SEM-based system decreases as the service time (or veriﬁcation time)
of rule database trdbs increases. Especially, the performance will deteriorate if trdbs exceeds 0.1 s. As
shown in Table 4, when trdbs is less than 40 ms, the maximum tag processing time is about 1 s, there
is no more than one tag which is waiting for processing and its waiting time is less than 0.5 s. Thus,
the performance is guaranteed. In the case that trdbs is between 40 ms to 100 ms, the requirement of
the application system is still met. According to special environment and requirement in reality, the
2L-SEM-based systems could keep the average service time of rule database trdbs be less than 0.1 s via
database self-optimization, e.g., partition, dynamic cache, and hierarchical architecture.
Table 4. Statistic results under different service time of rule database (s).
trdbs etmin etavg etmax qlmin qlavg qlmax wtmin qlavg wtmax
0.01 0.0003 0.1771 0.5241 0 0.004 1 0 0.0004 0.1148
0.02 0.0003 0.2866 0.8154 0 0.022 1 0 0.0017 0.2569
0.03 0.0003 0.3830 1.1155 0 0.061 1 0 0.0087 0.4539
0.04 0.0003 0.4919 1.4513 0 0.144 2 0 0.0320 0.7971
0.05 0.0003 0.6295 2.0787 0 0.236 3 0 0.0742 1.2397
0.06 0.0003 0.7705 2.4900 0 0.331 3 0 0.1338 2.0976
0.07 0.0003 0.9445 3.3102 0 0.466 3 0 0.2221 2.0030
0.08 0.0003 1.2873 4.8508 0 0.828 5 0 0.5057 4.0512
0.09 0.0003 1.4438 5.6199 0 0.866 5 0 0.5792 4.7174
0.10 0.0003 2.0405 8.7454 0 1.426 8 0 1.1033 7.4734
0.12 0.6512 24.2337 39.9250 0 20.827 36 0 23.0921 38.9538
0.15 0.8876 156.7548 319.2479 0 107.695 229 0 155.3244 318.6637
trdbs: average service time of rule database; et: processing time of tags;
ql: length of waiting queue; wt: waiting time for processing.
6. Conclusions
The scalability and ﬂexibility of 2G-RFID-Sys will support more intelligent applications in the future.
How to prevent mobile codes from being misused or abused and detect malicious mobile codes is
a critical issue of the 2G-RFID-Sys. This paper addresses the code-security issue by the following
three major contributions. First, location and time restrictions are deﬁned to represent the set of
authorization and restriction rules for special application system. Secondly, we propose a two-level
security enhancement mechanism for 2G-RFID-Sys by expanding the restraint policy and concept of
RBAC. Taking advantage of the context information, the mechanism can dynamically adjust a subject’s
role, and restrain the action capacity of the role to reduce the workload of role management. Thirdly,
the paper designs a reference architecture for the 2G-RFID-Sys based on the proposed mechanism.Sensors 2011, 11 6758
In addition, this paper presents an application case—a highway speed detection system—to illustrate
and verify how the proposed mechanism can provide intelligent and secure information processes for
2G-RFID-Sys. In future, we will represent more contextual restrictions (e.g., action-proﬁle restriction),
implement context process, and demonstrate 2L-SEM in the testbed with the help of backend based on
the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platform.
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